This article analyzes the role of economic and sociological studies in the debate over using public subsidies to build new professional sports stadiums. We show how academic studies have been neutralized by supporters of stadium subsidies, thereby making them less effective in policy debates. We illustrate how pro-stadium elites have ignored the studies, criticized them without competing evidence, commissioned contradictory studies, or shifted the debate to non-measurable endpoints. We speculate on some of the reasons why prostadiums advocates -in particular politicians and corporate elites -have chosen to support subsidies despite academic findings that suggest little economic payoff from subsidies. This article is drawn from primary research in nine American cities involved in new sports stadium construction.
Introduction
Over the past two decades, academic economists and sociologists have produced a significant number of studies that have called into question the wisdom of using public subsidies to build professional sports stadiums. The vast majority of these studies, while sometimes differing in methodologies and endpoints, have shown that the payoff to such investment is quite small and that public dollars could be better invested elsewhere, if the goal is to generate economic development for an entire city or region and not just for specific individuals or organizations.
Despite these fairly consistent findings, publicly subsidized stadiums are being built at a record rate.
1 Most major cities have either built new stadiums or found themselves under intense pressure to do so. A partial list includes stadiums under construction in Philadelphia, San Diego, and Cincinnati, following upon recent stadium openings in Houston, Arizona, Pittsburgh, and, again, Cincinnati. The life span of stadiums has grown shorter while the price tag has grown larger. Typical costs for new baseball stadiums have reached $500 million, while new NFL stadiums tend to cost between $350-$400 million. The public's official subsidy of these stadiums averages around 35%-40% of total costs; although the actual subsidy could be much more depending on how infrastructural improvement costs (new roads, bridges, etc) are counted (Delaney and Eckstein 2003; Eckstein and Delaney 2002) . In addition, the private owners' "contribution" to these stadiums is often covered by outside sources such as stadium naming rights (corporate money) or seat licenses (consumer money).
We are completing a large, comparative project that examines the political processes that create pro-stadium coalitions in nine American cities. This article focuses on one piece of this project: how are economic studies used in the debates over publicly subsidizing private stadiums? New stadium proponents have frequently argued that spending public dollars on private stadiums will help generate enormous economic advantages for the surrounding community, and especially the immediate neighborhood where they are built. However, most academic economists and sociologists disagree showing that using money this way is not a particularly wise public investment. How do public subsidy advocates deal with this academic consensus that runs contrary to their desire for subsidies?
A Very Brief Review of Academic Studies on New Stadiums
There are literally dozens of studies from economists and sociologists that show that there is only a modest (if any) payoff for investing public money in new professional sports stadiums.
2 Our intention in this paper is not to provide a thorough review of these studies since this has been done elsewhere (see Danielson 1997) . But, we think it will be helpful to summarize some of the typical approaches of these systematic academic studies.
Those who favor using public dollars for private stadiums argue that new stadiums will create jobs (including construction jobs and concession jobs), enhance tax revenues through increased ticket sales, and create ancillary economic development around the stadium. Academic sports economists have largely countered these contentions, arguing that professional sports teams are actually quite small operations when considered as part of a large metro area, typically accounting for about 0.2% of total employment in a city (Rosentraub 1997a; Zimbalist 1998) . Thus, sports franchises do not represent a very significant regional employer.
Furthermore, large-scale economic studies have found little support for the contention that new stadiums bring economic growth to cities. Okner (1974) was one of the first to argue that there was little evidence of a positive economic impact from professional sports. Baade and Sanderson (1997:112) concluded in their study that "creating jobs through subsidies to sports is inefficient and costly." Baade (1994; 1996) had previously studied 36 metro areas from and found no cases where a new stadium had a positive impact on a city's growth. Baade and Dye (1990) found that in 7 of 9 cities they studied, a city's share of regional income actually declined after adding a team or a new stadium. Coates and Humphreys (2000) studied 37 metropolitan areas and found that the presence of professional sports had no measurable impact on the growth rate of per capita income and had an overall negative effect on real per capita income. Economists often interpret these results to mean that spending at new stadiums largely represents a shifting of spending within a region, rather than new spending. This reflects a "substitution effect" where consumers make choices with their relatively inelastic entertainment budgets. 2 The best resource we have found for those interested in the economic impact studies is a very complete bibliography developed by Tim Chapin and found at http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/∼tchapin/stadia/stadia.html The most well known studies include Baade and Dye 1988; Baim 1994; Cagan and deMause 1998; Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Quirk and Fort 1997; and Rosentraub 1997. In addition, we would argue that money spent within the confines of a stadium may produce less economic benefit than if that money were spent throughout the region's economy (e.g., on video rentals, restaurants, movie and theatre tickets). This is because much of the money spent at stadiums goes to out-of-town corporations (e.g., Budweiser) or to salaries for players who do most of their spending elsewhere (and often retire elsewhere). Thus, the multiplicative effect of spending money within stadiums is not as great as it would be if the money were spent more broadly throughout the city's economy. This potentially negative economic effect is exacerbated by the new generation of stadiums where much of the ancillary economic activity is actually brought within the stadium's confines and controlled by the team owners rather than by community entrepreneurs.
Academic research typically employs methodologies that try to measure whether the public costs of new sports stadiums is offset by their economic and social benefits. Thus, they look at issues such as direct benefits, indirect benefits, initial costs and the costs of operation (Noll and Zimbalist 1997) . These studies tend to use large-scale macro data, although the measured endpoints sometimes differ. Some use per capita income, while others use per capita growth rates in cities or regional growth rates (Baade and Dye 1990; Coates and Humphreys 2000) . The methodologies employed are designed to include the substitution effect, since they are measuring whether total per capita growth rates increase in a city or region. This means they are able to test the claims of subsidy advocates that new stadiums will contribute to overall economic growth. However, because the endpoints are at such a macro level, it is difficult for any single phenomena (like a stadium) to actually move the growth rate of a large metropolitan region and to isolate the effects of a stadium from other large phenomena like national growth, economic recession or expansion.
Academic studies are nearly uniform in their findings that new stadiums do not contribute significantly to overall economic growth. One somewhat dissenting case was made by Rosentraub (1997b) who found that Indianapolis, by focusing on both sports facilities and a wider array of urban redevelopment projects had managed to stem suburbanization a bit better than 11 other comparable cities or regions. However, even in this case, Rosentraub (1997b:206) concluded that ". . .the initial gains from the sports strategy may have been short term in nature" as some competition for sports events from other cities has increased.
Methods
We have been studying the political processes of sports stadiums subsidies over the past five years. We have studied in detail nine American cities that have been deeply involved in these political battles. They are: Hartford, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Minneapolis, San Diego, Phoenix, and Denver. These cities were chosen to provide diverse regional representation as well as to include some cities in which subsidies were won more easily (Denver and Hartford), less easily (Pittsburgh, San Diego, Cleveland) and have not yet been won (Minneapolis). In a larger work (Delaney and Eckstein 2003) , we explore these political battles in great detail. This paper focuses on the battle over academic studies of the question of the economic impact of new stadiums. In most other work on this issue, the economic impact question is the end-point of the study. In this paper, we treat the use of these academic studies as part of the political battle to gain public subsidies.
In each of the cities in out study, we conducted interviews with key political leaders, corporate executives, professional team owners, and leaders of opposition groups. This paper relies on approximately 70 interviews conducted to date. We also completed a detailed ethnography of each stadium district and an extensive review of secondary sources in each city.
How Academic Studies are Neutralized
Why have academic studies questioning the wisdom of using large public subsidies for new sports stadiums not derailed the use of such subsidies? In other words, why have economists and sociologists been largely ineffectual in altering this important public policy debate? One possible reason could be that these studies are obdurate or incomprehensible to all but specialized scholars. However, in this case the critique is unfounded. These studies of new sports stadiums have been relatively easy to understand and accessible to non-scholarly readers. When some of these economists and sociologists have presented their findings in public hearings they have been remarkably clear and jargon-free. Similarly, these contradictory academic arguments have not been completely censored by powerful subsidy proponents. Summaries of these studies often find their way into the mainstream media and become part of the policy discussion.
In our research, we have found a range of responses to these academic studies by those who support using public dollars for private stadiums. First, the studies are simply ignored. Opponents to public subsidies may bring them up but that doesn't guarantee a response. Second, these studies are criticized and discredited often by associating them with outside agitators more interested in a partisan political agenda than with the local public interest. Third, public subsidy proponents sometimes commission and produce competing studies to contradict this scholarly research. Finally, the studies critical of subsidizing sports stadiums have been made moot as the policy debates shift away from economic issues and toward non-economic issues. In the following sections, we give examples of these strategies from the nine cities we have studied.
Studies are Ignored
Often, the studies of academic economists are simply ignored by stadium advocates. Instead, they continue insisting that owing to the new stadium, there will be many jobs created immediately (e.g., construction jobs), created later (e.g., selling souvenirs), and created nearby (e.g., restaurants and hotels). Of course, they rarely, or never, mention jobs lost at the old stadium, or whether public funds could be used for better economic or social purposes. Public subsidy advocates also ignore arguments about the substitution effect and continue insisting that consumers will spend new entertainment money visiting the new stadiums and not just shift their spending from other forms of entertainment. As one team owner told us, There is great economic power generated by drawing 3.5 million people. . . Many people we interviewed continually pointed to Cleveland, Baltimore, and Denver as glowing examples of how publicly financed stadiums turned around a city's economy. Another team owner insisted, If you look at Cleveland and Baltimore ten years ago, they were dying industrial rust belts and now they are [thriving] . If you ask people what was the number one factor in turning your city around I bet they would say Jacobs Field or Camden Yards.
There is very little empirical support for these statements. The neighborhood around Cleveland's new ballpark is not much different than it was ten years ago. One rejuvenated section of town ("the Flats") is not even near Jacobs Field. Although pro-stadium forces in other cities we studied told us that The Flats were created because of Jacobs Field. In Baltimore, the robust "Inner Harbor" area was thriving for a decade before Camden Yards arrived -thanks mostly to the superb National Aquarium, which is open 280 days more each year than the ballpark. In addition, one of Baltimore's poorest neighborhoods remains entrenched only a few blocks away from the stadium. Denver's Coors Field is nominally located in a once stagnant, now rejuvenated downtown area but it is many blocks away from the main action. Instead, the closest "economic activity" to its main entrance is a restored public storage facility. A waitress in a nearby restaurant told us that she hates game days at Coors Field because the activity drives away her regular customers who are superior tippers.
Some subsidy advocates even seem to prefer crystal balls to systematic academic studies. When we asked someone central to building Jacobs Field what kind of research supported the economic development hypotheses he replied, It was not studied. I just knew it. I would not waste $100,000 for someone to study this. It's the right place to build [the ballpark]. These things belong in downtown and it was a weird shaped site and we could nestle it into the city and the city can grow to it and the project will grow to the city. It will work assuming you design it right and don't surround it with a sea of surface parking.
Whether this site has "worked" in Cleveland is a matter of debate. This developer claims there are 36 new retail establishments within two blocks of second base. A mayoral aide reported 20 new businesses. We didn't find all twenty, unless you count as businesses the sea of parking lots and garages, which surround the ballpark.
Studies are Blunted
Ignoring this growing body of academic work has proven to be a poor strategy for those who wish to use public dollars for private stadiums. Typically, as debates heat up, anti-subsidy forces raise these very critical economic and sociological studies. We have found that opposition forces are growing more sophisticated in using academic studies to argue against stadium subsidies. In addition, stadium opponents in one city are connected with opponents from other cities through email, listservs and web sites. They constantly exchange information on the latest studies and how they might best frame them and disseminate them. Sometimes, as mentioned earlier, these academics will be invited to publicly testify about their findings. As a result, this systematic research often does become part of the discussion, even if subsidy advocates try to ignore it.
None of this comes as a surprise. What we did find surprising, however, was the process by which these studies are then denied, blunted, or ridiculed by powerful pro-stadium advocates. One anecdote illustrates beautifully a process we saw repeated more subtly in other cities. While we were interviewing the vice-president of a baseball team, he pulled out a letter forwarded to him by the president of city council (and later the mayor of that city). The council member had received from a constituent a well-informed letter summarizing economist Robert Baade's research, which was very critical of using public dollars for private stadiums. The constituent had even attached one of Baade's scholarly articles. What was most interesting, however, was the hand-written note from the council president to the team executive, which read, "What do I say to a constituent who makes this argument against a new stadium?"
The note did not ask whether Baade's argument was correct. Instead it requested a strategy for "blunting" it. Clearly, the team executive and politician were on the same side and were searching for an effective strategy to counter community resistance. When we asked the team executive how he had responded to the city council president's query, he replied that he read the article and discovered that Baade was only reporting on stadiums built before the late 1980s. He then asserted, with absolutely no evidence, that newer stadiums were somehow different since 1989. 3 This goes beyond merely ignoring the academic research and, instead, tries to counter it with a contrary intellectual argument. Of course, these arguments are not based on any systematic research but are merely hypothetical objections, which use select anecdotes to reach an opposite conclusion. A public subsidy supporter in Cleveland was equally imaginative with his more accurate "study."
So it seems pretty obvious to me that if you put up a ballpark and arena and bring 4.5 million people into a concentrated area, you are going to spur some economic development. You aren't going to change the economy of . . . northeast Ohio since all the sports activity in the area is only 1.5% of the local economy. But if you concentrate this activity into 28 acres then you can do it, right?
A primary supporter of Bank One Ballpark in Phoenix was especially sure of the economic benefits associated with the stadium and the idiocy of academics who thought otherwise. Don't hold me to exact numbers, but this is close. The construction of the facility itself had about a $300 million economic impact, it was the equivalent of 3,000 full time jobs, about $13 million in new sales taxes generated from the construction, on an annual basis, the economic impact is about $250 million. About 2500 full time jobs. . . That kind of economic benefit is measurable. These are not dollars that would be used elsewhere, which is what the economists say. What's the word they use? [Substitution effect?] Yes, these are not new dollars they say! That's bull. . . . These anecdotal economic claims give new stadium supporters a way to contradict (without any semblance of evidence) the growing list of critical academic studies. These academics, it is explained, just don't understand the nuances of stadium generated economic development. They've probably never even been to a new ballpark to bask in the smell of economic activity. And besides, as we heard throughout our research, "our city is different."
Academic Studies are Challenged by Advocacy Studies
Sometimes subsidy proponents go further than simply ignoring or deriding academic studies that challenge the economic benefits associated with new stadiums. Instead, they commission their own studies to demonstrate the positive economic impact of new stadium construction. We were able to obtain several of these studies, usually performed by hired consulting firms (often large public accounting firms). We will discuss four of these studies in some detail because we believe they are representative of the types of studies commissioned by teams or political organizations to refute the academic studies performed by economists.
These documents, which we call "advocacy studies," are quite unlike academic studies. First, the endpoints are usually much different. The academic studies usually look at macro, objective economic factors in an SMSA such as overall economic growth, tax revenue growth or employment growth. The advocacy studies rely on more subjective data usually gathered through surveys and questionnaires where people will speculate on future economic behavior. Such subjective data are not inherently inferior to more objective macro data, but they are especially susceptible to sloppy methodology.
Two studies done in Denver are typical of prospective studies in which advocates make all sorts of promises for a proposed stadium (see Denver study 1992; Silverstein, n.d.) . 4 These fantasy documents are typical of those done before the actual construction of a stadium. Their main purpose is to make the case for using public dollars for a new stadium. Because they are written before final stadium plans are executed, they often promise an incredible amount of economic spin-off activity for the contemplated stadium -promises that rarely come true. For example the Denver studies spoke of a new pedestrian overpass from Union Station to the ballpark plaza, new housing immediately adjacent to the stadium and an international shopping district as well as a new 23 rd St. viaduct. Now that the stadium is built, it is clear that these promises were not fulfilled. Only the viaduct, which allows easy entrance and exit to the stadium area for cars, was fulfilled. Most of the housing has not appeared and pawnshops and warehouses still largely populate the area contemplated for an "international" shopping district. The Downtown Ballpark Redevelopment Committee Report (see Denver report, 1992) also called for tastefully landscaping the main parking lot, and to have this lot used for other activities. Seven years after this report, when we visited Denver, the lot was utterly barren; and even on a busy December Saturday night, with LoDo restaurants and parking lots crammed, the main stadium lot was totally empty. Finally, this document contained an artist's rendition of the 21 st St. "streetscape improvements" which were guaranteed to accompany the new stadium. The new 21 st St. would have shops and wide sidewalks, which would lead from near downtown directly to the ballpark's main entrance. In 1999, it looked much the same as it did in 1992.
It is probably worthwhile to point out unfulfilled promises to show how fantastical some of the prospective fantasy documents can be, but to be fair, projects change and not all promises come to fruition. Another type of fantasy document, however, are the retrospective kind done with existing stadiums to show that they have indeed fulfilled their promises as economic engines. Unlike the prospective studies, which have almost no methodology (just promises), the retrospective studies are dressed in methodological regalia. But the methodological approaches and assumptions are completely different from those in the academic studies discussed at the outset. We will discuss two examples of this sort of fantasy document, a study done in Philadelphia on the value of the existing Veterans' stadium (used to argue for public dollars for a new replacement) and a study done on the newly opened Bank One Ballpark in Phoenix.
In 1997 Arthur Anderson LLP presented a report commissioned by the Central Philadelphia Development Corporation entitled, "The Economic Impact of a Ballpark in Central City Philadelphia" (Anderson study 1997) . The study was intended to show the different economic impacts of a new ballpark built in center city Philadelphia versus one built near the current Veterans Stadium a few miles south of center city. However, the study was largely based on an examination of the annual economic impact of the Phillies to the city of Philadelphia in their current location. The authors estimated the amount of money being spent outside the current Phillies' ballpark and considered this spending completely attributable to the stadium's presence.
Rather than use city our county tax receipts, net revenues or economic growth figures, Anderson conducted a fan survey during five home games to measure out-of-stadium spending before and after attending a Phillies game. A total of 1,652 fans responded to the survey. These fans were asked about where they lived, where they worked, how they got to the game, and where and how much they spent on food, drink and entertainment before and after the game. The study reported that fans spent an average of $23.32 outside of Veterans Stadium excluding parking. This figure was then multiplied by the average in-park attendance for the year (1,980,000 fans) for an estimated $46,200,000 in external spending, all of which was attributed to the stadium.
The most important problem with this study is its sampling methods. The people who received and returned the survey were likely not a random sample of fans. Indeed, the final report publicized by the Phillies gives no information on sampling procedure even though it is a critical part of any survey. Most likely, fans were chosen on their way into the stadium and handed the one page survey. Some probably threw it away, others completed it. Possibly, out of towners and one-time attendees were more likely to show interest in the survey than were people who regularly attend games. If true, this would lead to an over-sampling of non-locals (who presumably spend more money) and an under-sampling of Philadelphia residents.
More importantly, it is highly likely that children were not sampled. Although the report makes no mention of it, our guess is that children did not fill out the survey since the questions on employment suggest that it wasn't designed for them. Thus, heads of households were probably oversampled from the actual population of fans at the game while kids were under-sampled. These adults will most likely report on the entire family's spending and not just their own individual spending as one member of the family. Therefore, it is wrong to multiply the $23.12 by the entire fan base because not every individual is spending that amount.
The second problem with this study like most advocacy studies is they ignore the substitution effect. It is possible that survey respondents exaggerated their spending, or at least included spending they would have done even without attending the ball game. If you get pizza after the game, is that spending really solely attributable to your stadium visit or would you have grabbed that pizza anyway? It seems quite plausible that you might have spent the same amount of money on something besides the Phillies. The team's claiming credit for this spending is like small business owners asking their workers how much they spent on their lunch break, on their way to work that morning and on their way home and then claiming that their businesses were responsible for this spending. With this logic, the shop owners could request public subsidies to expand their business to further stimulate the local restaurant economy.
Another retrospective advocacy study prepared for Phoenix Downtown Partnership studied the impact of the Diamondback in their first half year of operation (with results extrapolated to a full year; see Pollack study 1998). In this study, the authors included spending of $12.60 per person on "restaurants, bars, grocery stores, convenience stores, gas stations, and other establishments" as attributable to the team and the stadium. This figure comes from an estimate done in an earlier study conducted before the stadium opened (Deloitte and Touche study 1993). This spending estimate again does not appear to consider the substitution effect. This means that an increase in gasoline sales in the nearby downtown area is counted as new spending attributable to the stadium and, thus, an unspoken assumption is made that those individuals would not have gotten gas in the city absent the ballpark (Pollack study 1998:15).
We argue that these studies often overestimate the value of the stadium to the area by attributing nearly any economic activity near the stadium to the stadium's presence. Unlike the academic studies described at the beginning of this article, these sorts of advocacy studies do not measure net economic growth, net tax revenue increases to the city, or net employment growth in the city. They simply credit the new stadium (or the proposed new stadium) for any business activity in the surrounding area, without subtracting any lost businesses around the new stadium (or old stadium if one preceded the new stadium) and without considering the substitution effect. Indeed, this advocacy seem to reflect what Lee Clarke (1999) calls "fantasy documents" which use pseudo-scientific regalia to legitimize organizationally biased points of view.
Shifting to Non-measurable Endpoints
An increasingly popular strategy for neutralizing these academic studies is to admit that the economic question cannot be won and then argue that it's really not about economics anyway. Here, subsidy advocates argue that the value of a team to a region simply cannot be measured in dollars and cents. Instead, professional sports teams bring visibility, publicity and notoriety to a city; or teams and their new stadiums bring residents together to overcome the divisions so common in urban America. In this case, the debate is either shifted to economic benefits that cannot be as easily measured (publicity, visibility, and attractiveness), or to completely non-economic benefits (solidarity, happiness, or family togetherness). Thus, instead of fighting an increasingly difficult battle about economic windfalls, stadium subsidy supporters shift their strategy to emphasize "community self esteem" and "community collective conscience" (Eckstein and Delaney 2002) .
One part of this community self-esteem is related to economics, but is much harder to measure empirically. This concerns the ability of companies to attract executives to their headquarters. New stadiums, preferably subsidized, are seen as an appealing amenity for securing these workers. According to a Cleveland executive, You are in Cleveland, Ohio and you have 23 or 24 Fortune 500 companies headquartered here and these guys are competing for CFOs and COOs and all these key players with cities all over the world and they are trying to get the same talent you get in New York and Philadelphia and San Francisco and Los Angeles. So what are you going to sell? You sell the city's amenities. We have a great art museum, a great orchestra, and major league sports. Nice suburbs? There are nice suburbs everywhere.
In terms of community collective conscience, subsidy supporters in many different cities like to talk about the wonderful by-products of professional sports and new stadiums. As two subsidy advocates put it, I don't want to overlook this quality of life issue and what impact baseball has on families. With the disintegration of families in our country, to me this is an important issue, because one of the most enjoyable things I had last year was watching families, the little kids with parents and grandparents and all of them enjoying [the game]. . . I think sports can bring people together across social and economic lines. Those lines are obliterated. You can have a CEO of a major corporation sitting next to a homeless person and they both are there for a baseball game; they are both there for the same reason. They can afford to be there. So, it has tremendous social value. . . I make the argument that it's good for the quality of life of the community and it is good for the soul of the community. It's good to be able to go to a place to yell at the umpire. In sports, people get out their feelings. It's a great thing for the soul.
We are certain that subsidy supporters will continue to abandon their promises of economic windfall and instead focus on these less tangible and less measurable impacts of new sports stadiums. Perhaps it is a tribute to these critical economic and sociological studies that subsidy supporters have completely changed the subject. How could a systematic academic study possibly refute this piece of "evidence" we were offered to support Cleveland's use of public dollars for private stadiums: the bike messengers around town were smiling more since the new ballpark opened.
Why Academic Studies are Neutralized
We are convinced that, even in the face of contradictory academic research, many of the people we interviewed sincerely believe their position that public money for private stadiums is a justifiable use of public resources. However, it is equally clear that they see these academic studies as obstacles to achieving their goals. Thus, an increasingly central strategy of pro-subsidy forces is neutralizing this critical economic and sociological research. This neutralization strategy has been quite successful. The economic issues are complex enough so that it doesn't take much to obfuscate matters a little more and send relatively well-informed citizens running for cover. The strategic shift to emphasizing non-economic issues like community self esteem and community collective conscience present a charming combination of pop psychology and Norman Rockwell which makes for snappy sound bites that appeal to local residents. A Cincinnati journalist summed up this phenomenon:
The thought was what distinguishes us from these other towns is that we have two major league teams in such a small market. We need to hang on to this so we don't become another one of those podunk towns that doesn't have football. There was exit polling after the sales tax vote [to subsidize the new stadiums] and people said they voted for it but complained bitterly. Said these rich team owners don't deserve all this money; we're just working stiffs so why should we pay more? But a lot of these people said I held my nose and voted yes because I don't want the city to turn into Dayton.
Pro-subsidy strategies, including the neutralization of academic research, are pursued by powerful coalitions led by local business leaders (including team owners) and government officials. Representatives from other social institutions (i.e., media, religion, labor) sometimes join forces with these corporate and political elites to push for public funding of new sports stadiums. Our interview data suggest that political elites and business elites differ somewhat on how they frame and organize their pro-subsidy arguments. While there is certainly nothing mutually exclusive about these arguments, we believe the patterns are interesting and important, especially as they contribute to the neutralization of academic studies.
Political Leaders
Political supporters of stadium subsidies differ from corporate supporters mainly in how they define and perceive "economic growth." Political supporters of stadium subsidies generally eschew subtle macro measures of economic growth (i.e., net employment and tax receipts) and instead define economic growth as a highly visible social activity. Political elites like to point to large, noteworthy projects that occur while they are in office. This allows for patronage opportunities, but perhaps more importantly helps them create the image of a first class city. Here, the highly visible project (stadiums get covered by the press on an almost daily basis) is favored over these visible projects will generate economic development, so neutralizing contrary positions is a very important component of their future success. This "trial and error" approach to highly visible economic development projects often leads to faddishness, and copying whatever they believe is working in other cities. An urban planner in Cleveland remarked,
A lot of what we do is driven by fads. Twenty or thirty years ago, the downtown pedestrian mall was all the vogue. It turned out not to work in a lot of places. Then, there was the "festival market" thing that was the panacea and everyone had that. In places like Toledo and Richmond, it collapsed. So, now we had to get something else, and it is professional sports. I am always totally amazed at how economic analysis says one thing, yet the mayor and the other guys do the other thing without paying any attention.
There is no more visible urban project these days than a new sports stadium. In Pittsburgh, for example, the local paper wrote about the new stadium construction just about every day and even went so far as to profile the man who captained the boat that brought the steel beams down the river for the new Steelers' stadiums. Most cities and teams set up web cams to allow fans to watch the construction of the new stadium -which is not a far cry from the proverbial "watching paint dry." It is hard to imagine such interest in any other construction project. A Pittsburgh mayoral assistant said,
The teams are the city's identity. The Japanese know who Jaromir Jagr is [hockey player on the Pittsburgh Penguins]. They don't know who Tom O'Brien from PNC Bank is. For better or worse, it is national identity.
Sports are certainly different from most other aspects of economic culture and activity. They operate in a highly visible place because they are at once economic entities but also serve as emblems of cities and some of its citizens. For this reason, politicians do not want to see a team leave (or even decline) on their watch. When teams actually leave cities that do not build them new stadiums, there are really very few economic consequences. For example, Los Angeles does not seem to have fallen much since losing their football Rams several years ago; and Houston was doing fine even after the Oilers left for Tennessee. But in symbolic terms, it may mean much more. And it is this symbolic rhetoric that primarily fuels the political attacks on academic studies questioning the economic benefits of publicly subsidized sports stadiums.
Business Leaders
In many cities, CEOs of local corporations lead the charge for public subsidies to new stadiums, although they often lead this charge from behind closed doors. Corporate elites tend to frame their pro-stadium support differently than politicians and therefore have different reasons (and strategies) for neutralizing critical academic research. Ironically, the vast majority of the business leaders we interviewed did not believe new stadiums would provide community economic windfalls. In fact, it is the corporate champions of subsidized sports stadiums who are most responsible for abandoning the discussion of economic windfalls, hoping to render moot these critical academic studies.
As we mentioned earlier, part of this new strategy is somewhat economic and has to do with the corporate community's ability to attract what one ex-CEO termed the "A players" of the executive labor market. So, even though these business leaders often admitted that public money could be invested more wisely, they favor new stadiums as important "amenities" that can help them recruit new employees and make them more organizationally sound. As one longtime business leader and civic activist put it:
Generally speaking, the large employers in the state have a real concern about the quality of life in the community, because they have to compete for talent with other major corporations all over the country. Those people are much more interested in the quality of life for those employees than the average person.
However, business leaders do not publicly argue that local residents should support subsidized sports stadiums because it is good for their corporations' bottom line. Instead, they insist that new stadiums will add to important non-economic factors such as community self esteem and community collective conscience. The quotes we offered earlier on these themes came strictly from business leaders. A developer in Pittsburgh nicely sums up the corporate community's shifting position on stadiums:
Sports, you could argue over the numbers, but they are just not economic generators. If you had, say, $100 million to spend in the region and wanted to get the most economic impact, sports teams wouldn't do it. But the teams are part of the community. The stadiums will provide us with a civic shot in the arm and be good publicity for the region.
Corporate leaders, then, tend to conclude that the economic issues are muddled, and instead defend their roles as contributing to a major civic project within their city. They come to view their work in lobbying for new stadiums as "wearing their civic hat," as many of them called it. They think of their work on behalf of the new stadium as work to help their city "as a city" rather than as a wise economic investment of public money. We must say, too, that many of these business leaders themselves seem to be avid sports fans. So, they get to do what they see as their "civic duty" while cozying up to professional sports owners and feeling a special part of the home team and the new stadium.
Mass Media
There are several ways in which the local media participate in this neutralization of critical academic research. First, the mass media in the U.S. (generally), and in these cities (specifically) are increasingly owned by a decreasing number of mega-corporations. This centralization makes it much harder for the media to act as a "watchdog" over the egregious actions of powerful corporations since, in essence, the media would be watching over itself. This overt conflict of interest was apparent, for example, in Cincinnati where stadium opponents alleged that a huge media conglomerate, JCOR Communications, was essentially censoring some of its radio personalities for their on-air challenges of the proposed new stadiums in that city. Similarly, it was reported to us that a powerful newspaper publisher in San Diego was a vociferous advocate of keeping any new ballpark criticisms out of the paper and behind closed doors. In Minneapolis, the coalition that successfully advocated for the Metrodome in the early 1980s was actually driven by the publisher of the Minneapolis Star-Tribune (Weiner 2000) . In all of these cases, media corporations were active (if not leading) members of the local business community, which tried to influence public policy for their own organizational ends.
In addition to this overt conflict of interest, the media also played a subtler role in neutralizing academic research critical of new stadiums. This is reflected both by official editorial positions and by how managers select and assign certain stories. In all of the nine cities we studied, the major local newspaper editorially championed spending public dollars on private stadiums (the local electronic media seemed also to be completely supportive but this was much harder to determine empirically given the lack of archival data). Editorials supporting the new stadiums would often parrot the fantasy documents we have been discussing and (mostly) ignored contrary arguments.
Media managers also tried to influence the coverage of stadium-related stories. For instance, there was an ugly skirmish between publishers/editors and journalists at The Cincinnati Enquirer. According to a reporter, the powerful local business community made it clear to the paper's owners and editors that it did not appreciate the frequent negative stories about the stadium initiatives, casting a dark cloud over the newsroom.
Fortunately, this sort of pressure was rare and newspapers in these cities were usually very thorough in their coverage of the new sports stadiums. However, this does not mean that the media didn't ignore (either by choice or by fiat) pieces of the story that would also have proven interesting. For example, local papers rarely offered an explicit critique of the fantasy documents generated by so many of the stadium advocates in these cities. Even if the journalists were not capable of producing such a critique themselves, they could have received assistance from other quarters. By reproducing these fantasy documents without comment, the media helped legitimate their conclusions while simultaneously (although maybe not intentionally) marginalizing more critical academic research.
The potential influence of a less sycophantic media was apparent in Pittsburgh where the city's "second" mainstream newspaper (The Pittsburgh Tribune) was as critical of publicly financed stadiums as the "first" paper (The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette) was supportive. In addition, the libertarian publisher of this paper, Richard Scaife, owned his own think tank, the Allegheny Institute on Public Policy, which generated scores of position papers critical of publicly financed stadiums. These reports, of course, were picked up and legitimated by the Tribune where they had a very important impact on Pittsburgh's new stadium initiative. In fact, in almost unprecedented fashion, stadium advocates were crushed in a referendum seeking to raise local taxes for these two new ballparks and had to completely rethink their strategy (which was ultimately successful). The Tribune's hostility certainly contributed to this surprising electoral defeat. Perhaps other referendums in other cities would have unfolded differently had the local media not been economic and political bedfellows of prostadium forces.
Conclusion
After spending time in nine cities, it is clear to us that building new sports stadiums is not at heart an economic question, even if prosubsidy advocates sometimes package it that way. These advocates have developed strategies for neutralizing the systematic academic research that challenges the economic benefits of these public policies. The most significant strategic tactic of this neutralization is the corporate-led shift of the debate away from whether economics even matter. These noneconomic justifications argue that professional sports teams (generally) and new stadiums (specifically) will augment the collective prestige of a city and make local citizens feel better about themselves. This strategic shift, constructed and supported with the help of the local media, finds confluence with politicians' desires to build highly visible projects, and satisfies team owners' desire to increase the value of their business. It is a strong formula that often overwhelms economic and sociological research.
The pathway to publicly subsidized sports stadiums has gone much more smoothly in cities where the corporate dominated pro-subsidy coalitions have abandoned the economic windfall arguments and successfully refocused the debate around less tangible and less measurable non-economic ideas. One important reason that this strategic shift is more successful, we argue, is because it effectively neutralizes the economic and sociological research critical of economic windfall arguments. But just because this is a better strategy does not mean that stadiums supporters in all cities will select this strategy. While some of this might be attributable to bad decision-making, it is even more important to consider how the structural characteristics of some cities simply do not lend themselves to these neutralization tactics. Sometimes this structural limitation is rooted in the "personality" of a city. For example, people in Philadelphia would have a hard time arguing that the city would become "another Harrisburg" without two new publicly subsidized stadiums. Philadelphia's downtown is a thriving mix of residences, business, and cultural outlets that is increasingly popular even without a stadium around the corner. Similarly, in rapidly growing cities like Denver, Phoenix, and San Diego, it is impossible to convincingly argue that new stadiums are necessary for creating a "major league" image for the area, thereby attracting new businesses and residents. People are streaming to these areas with or without new publicly financed stadiums. As a result, stadium advocates are practically forced to use less effective strategies promising economic development. This makes it harder, although by no means impossible, to successfully challenge critical academic research.
We would respectfully suggest that academics interested in this topic, either intellectually or as contributors to public policy, also shift their strategy. Economists and sociologists should consider it a victory that many subsidy proponents have abandoned their specious economic windfall arguments. The devil was in the details. But the debate has now shifted. New research must reflect how the argument is being reframed in qualitative terms, which means we should rely more on ethnographic studies and interviews instead of strictly on aggregate economic data. There are many powerful people who remain supportive of using public money for private stadiums, and they will keep trying to come up with new ways to avoid dealing with the devilish details.
